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Chapter	  9,	  The	  Global	  Strong	  Arms	  Versus	  Global	  Civil	  Society	  
The following chapter is the conclusion to Brian Castellani’s book, The Defiance of Global Commitment: 
A Complex Social Psychology.  For more, go to the following link: https://www.routledge.com/The-
Defiance-of-Global-Commitment-A-Complex-Social-Psychology/Castellani/p/book/9780815353171 
ABSTRACT 
Brian Castellani http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8763-8052	  
This chapter begins with a summary of chapters 1 through 8 in order to act as a standalone overview of 
the main arguments of the book.  With this summary complete, its addresses the final three concerns of 
our study.  The first is the rise of the Global Strongarms, those political and cultural leaders who seek to 
turn people away from their global commitments and to embrace the complex triad of global fear, 
nostalgia retreatism and global aggression.  The second is a prognosis about the near and also future 
outcome of global life, vis-à-vis the numerous global social problems we presently face.  The third 
explores what can be done, which brings us to our study’s conclusion: the besieged triangular conflict, the 
world-over, between global civil society versus nostalgic retreat and global aggression, which are driven 
hard by global fear, is a societal manifestation of an evolving psychological drama.  In other words, 
globalization, in all of its complexity, including its global social problems, is a grand-scale window into 
the interior machinations of the human psyche and its conflicted relationship with others and itself.  And 
so it seems that if we are looking outward to solve the problems of the world and, more specifically, the 
tripartite problem of retreat-aggression-civility, we are looking the wrong way.  The real enemy (and 
solution) resides within, each of us. 
PRÉCIS	  DE	  NOS	  RECHERCHES	  
While we have arrived finally at the end of our journey, we need to begin with a synopsis of the complex 
social psychology we have so far assembled.  Hence the purpose of this somewhat extended précis: 
Our study began with a basic concern, motivated by recent global events, which seemed to suggest that, 
when viewed together, the latest advances in global civil society were under threat or even siege.  A quick 
list of these countervailing events – by no means representative – included the unexpected Brexit vote; the 
impossible election of Donald Trump; the upsurge of nationalism throughout Europe; the devolution of 
the Arab Spring into the Arab Winter; the ascent of Chinese economic imperialism; global warming and 
disruptive climate change; and the riotous instabilities of the world capitalist system.   
More important for us, however, was the realization that all these events, despite their differences, seemed 
to share a common denominator: they all appeared to be less a failure of policy or politics and more a 
complex social psychological reaction (and mostly negative) to globalization or, alternatively, global civil 
society – the results of which presently threaten not only our happiness and wellbeing as a species but 
also our survival.  Globalization, as a reminder, refers to the complex ways in which the world has 
become more doggedly interconnected; while global civil society refers to the social commitments and 
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moral responsibilities that the management of this unrelenting interdependence requires, including the 
global social problems thus created. 
We therefore had the impetus for our study: we would seek to assemble a complex social psychology of 
the defiance of global commitment; and to do so, we would engage in a critical reading of Freud’s 
Civilization and Its Discontents (1930).  Freud’s book, while nearly 90 years old, remains a powerful 
treatise on the multifaceted ways in which the demands of society and its social problems are an 
evolutionary constraint upon and yet, simultaneously, a macroscopic manifestation of the darker and more 
untamed reaches of the human psyche and its mammalian past. 
Freud, however, would not be our only source of theoretical inspiration and scientific support.  We would 
also draw upon the latest research in such key fields as paleoanthropology, affective neuroscience, 
sociological psychology, globalization studies, cognitive science, feminism, poststructuralism and the 
complexity sciences, as well as such key scholars as Manuel Castells, Patricia Hill Collins, Michel 
Foucault, Sylvia Walby, and Immanuel Wallerstein.  With our focus and framework established, we 
outlined our study’s five main research questions: 
• What are the major social psychological tensions that stand in the way of our global
commitments?
• How has globalization in all of its complexity fostered or emboldened these tensions?
• How have these tensions led to the defiance of global commitment, and by whom and to what
extent?
• How have these tensions and their related defiances helped to create the global social
psychological problems we currently face?
• And, finally, how do these tensions, global social psychological problems and defiances
challenge the advance of global civil society?
Section	  I	  
To answer these questions we began, as one always does, at the beginning, with Freud’s first chapter and 
his preoccupation with the twin topics of oceanic feeling and religion.  Disagreeing with Freud’s negative 
assessment of religion, we embraced oceanic feeling as a legitimate psychological experience – redefining 
it as a type of deeply-felt awareness of the global web of life and one’s place within it; what sociologists 
call a sociological imagination; and what complexity scientists call a complex systems view of the world. 
The challenge with this view, however, is that the world seems, at present, to be in open combat over it, 
as people profoundly disagree with one another over the extent to which we (as a global society) should 
embrace our shared ‘systemic’ struggles and our common ‘complex’ social problems.  And there are 
some very legitimate social psychological reasons for this conflict, including our doomed pursuit of 
happiness.  All of which took us to Chapter 2. 
For a whole host of reasons, such as death, the inevitable decay of the body, the harshness of living, and 
the cruelty of social life, Freud sees happiness as a fated pursuit. And yet humans, it seems, are 
condemned to do so.  We saw that current research supports his claim, suggesting that desires such as 
happiness and seeking are hardwired into our paleomammalian brain and our affective consciousness, part 
of our complex instinctual pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain.  Unlike the rest of the animal 
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kingdom, however, humans also desire to drive expensive cars, own large homes, and consume half the 
planet to be happy.  And, equally important, they do not like global civil society (or anyone for that 
matter) telling them they cannot – hence the doomed nature of this pursuit: the irony of life is that the 
greater good of the planet comes from our collective embrace of the psychic restraints and moral demands 
of society; and yet, because of the broken nature of this embrace, due to the evolutionary limitations of 
the human psyche, society will always fail us; and yet it still remains our best hope. 
 
Section	  II:	  	  	  
The same irony is true of global civil society and the impossible promise of globalization. One of the 
most provocative claims Freud makes in Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930) is that the unfolding of 
society is part of our species’ developmental process, given the powerful evolutionary role that social life 
has served us.  Once started, however, the conflicted project of ‘society’ seems to take on a life of its own 
– driven ever onward (like some out-of-control cybernetic system) toward greater levels of 
interconnectivity.  One such example is globalization and its commensurate global civil society; with the 
former driving the world toward near-uninhibited global interdependence, no matter the inequality, 
instability, destruction or harm; and with the latter desperately seeking to manage it or tame it, at least 
somewhat; and with everyone else, the world-over, figuring out how to ‘game’ the global system to their 
advantage, be it through nostalgic-retreat, an embrace of global civil society, or one form of global 
aggression or another. 
 
Hence our focus in Chapter 3, which was less a sociological assessment of globalization as-it-is; and 
instead a social psychological exploration of globalization as it is differently understood. This ‘explore’ 
as it were, led us to review such globalizing forces as post-industrialism, world systems theory, global 
network society, and the world capitalist system.  It also led us to debate what globalization is, the ways it 
has succeeded or failed, and for whom and in what ways – and with the varying opinions falling into three 
major social psychological camps, which people, the world-over, must address within themselves: the 
globalist viewpoint, the retreating nostalgic viewpoint and the global civil society viewpoint. 
 
And, it is with these insights that we began to construct our catalogue of the different ways people, the 
world-over, have responded to the forces of globalization and global civil society; what we variously 
called the complex social psychologies of the world.  Examples, which we spent the rest of the book 
exploring, included fear of the global, eco-primitivism, neoliberalism, nostalgic patriarchy and the 
globalists. 
 
Before we did, however, we reviewed our Section II Note on Method, which provided several key 
caveats.  First, we pointed out that our catalogue is comprised of a variety of different complex social 
psychological viewpoints.  Some, such as fear of the global, are embraced by almost everyone, while 
others, such as eco-primitivism, by only a minority of people.  Also, most people hold a combination of 
views.  For example, one might support neoliberalism and nostalgic patriarchy, but advocate for global 
civil society to address racism, poverty and sustainable growth – which goes to another point: people 
often hold contradictory views.  For example, people can be raving nationalists and globalists at the same 
time.  Such are the riddles of the human psyche.  As such, we decided that the complex social 
psychologies we uncovered during our study were best treated as fluid and intersecting, with people 
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moving in and out of different viewpoints and their associated groups.  Finally, we made it clear that our 
catalogue is neither exhaustive nor all-inclusive; also, given the complexity of the world, it should not be 
taken too literally or seriously, as it is only a working guide, a scientific trace. 
 
With our catalogue ready, we turned to the issue of global fear and the social psychology of group 
conflict.  Within the dark interiors of the human psyche, individual and group-based fear of the global 
seems the biggest threat to global civil society.  At the individual level, the psyche becomes more selfish 
or defensive or even outright aggressive or hostile, as it seeks to protect or preserve itself and its interests 
(a.k.a. happiness) against globalization or global civil society’s intrusion.  Individuals also become highly 
wary of making sacrifices in a global world that would be to the benefit of others, particularly anyone 
outside of kin and kind.  At the collectivist level, in-groups (which can range from kin networks to 
nations) turn toward themselves, while simultaneously turning away from any out-group, which they 
associate with the forces of globalization or global civil society.  Equally important, prompted by a global 
threat, these in-groups also often shore themselves against the outside world by more severely defining, 
limiting or identifying with each other.  In turn, this ‘shoring up’ can also lead to aggressive, hostile or 
violent behavior toward members of the opposing out-group.  Examples range from ISIS and Syria to 
China and North Korea to the increased racial tensions in the States and Africa.  It also includes the clash 
between the easternization and westernization of global society. 
 
With our review of these issues clear, we also spent chapters 3 and 4 exploring those social psychologies 
that support global civil society.  The reader will recall that we also briefly discussed the globalist (e.g., 
pro-global capitalism) view in these chapters, even though it was a primary focus in Chapter 8. 
 
Those who endorse global civil society come in a variety of forms, including many of the international 
organizations we examined: United Nations, European Union, World Health Organization.  Other groups 
include social democrats, eco-feminists and most of the scholars in the globalization literature.  While all 
of these groups and individuals vary considerably in their arguments and agendas – for example, some are 
very supportive of globalization and the world capitalist system – they are similar insomuch as they seek 
to solve the global fear problem.  And they all support, in one way or another, the advance of global civil 
society, ecological and biodiversity responsibility, and global civil rights for everyone.  Those in the 
global civil society camp, however, seem to be, at least in terms of power and position, in the global 
minority, with the globalist viewpoint presently having the upper hand, given the number of politically 
and economically powerful individuals, groups, organizations and governments that support it.  Betwixt 
and between these two is the retreating nostalgic view, which has a particularly strong voice in many 
globally western and northern societies. 
 
Retreating nostalgia and its related issue of resentment come in a variety of forms.  As outlined in Chapter 
4, however, not all forms of resentment are nostalgic.  For example, there is resentful affluence, which 
embraces globalization but is opposed to any form of global civil society that seeks to restrain or limit the 
materialist gain of the affluent.  And, as readers will recall from Chapter 8, resentful affluents also 
embrace a continuum of global aggression, ranging from revolving elites and neoliberals to the richest 
and most powerful global aggressors throughout the world. 
 
	   210	  
In terms of our three main forms of nostalgia, the first was resentful nostalgia.  The main difference here 
is that those who endorse this complex social psychology are neither privileged nor affluent.  As such, 
their resentment has to do with the sense of being left behind by globalization.  Residing within and 
across this view are racial-ethnic nationalism and patriarchal nostalgia.  Racial-ethnic nationalism and 
its populist corollary both support, in one way or another, the rights of local culture, community or 
society over all else.  We saw this resentment, for example, in our exploration of the anti-immigration 
issue in France, Norway, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  In turn, there is patriarchal nostalgia, 
which seeks to return (or perpetuate) some type of heterosexist patriarchal past, be it domestic or public.   
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum is eco-primitivism.  Again, while differences within this complex 
social psychology exist, the common goal is to return/forward the world to an ecologically sustainable 
form of existence; therefore, while they are in open revolt against global aggression, they tend to support 
global civil society.  As such, many eco-primitivists also endorse global civil society. 
 
Finally, there is puritanical nostalgia, which embraces the traditions of the old-world and its patriarchal, 
religious and heterosexual dominance, or some traditional variant thereof.  These individuals therefore 
oppose any aspect of globalization or global civil society that counters their worldview, as in the case of 
secularism or women’s rights; however, if some aspect of global society is to their benefit, they may 
embrace it, as in the case of cyberinfrastructure or global trade.  Such a selective embrace of globalization 
and global civil society by puritanical nostalgics is not necessarily, as we learned from Foucault, a social 
psychological contradiction, as the truth régimes of every global group seem incongruous to those outside 
looking in.  All of which led us to explore Foucault theory on the relationship between knowledge and 
power.  Put succinctly, people embrace the truths that empower them to achieve the happiness and control 
they want, no matter how dark or cruel that happiness or control happens to be for others. 
 
This equality of embrace, however, does not make all such approaches equally healthy or therapeutic.  
But that is a point for later, because, as readers will recall, we needed to turn elsewhere at this point, to 
follow Freud into the deeper and more ancient and primitive layers of the human psyche. 
 
Section	  III:	  
One of the most important claims Freud makes in The Uneasiness Inherent in Culture is that if 
civilization is to secure for people the widest possible happiness for the greatest number of people, it is 
necessary for global civil society to find effective ways to therapeutically manage and, in turn, effectively 
police many of the idstincts, drives and dysfunctions of humans.  And of these, two sets are absolutely 
crucial to address, given their central role in our global defiance: sex, sexuality and gender; and 
aggression, otherness and death.  Freud therefore devotes the remainder of his study (Chapters 4 to 8) to 
examining the extent to which such an effective management is possible or alternatively the extent of its 
limits.  And to do so he famously draws upon his catalogue of psychoanalytic theories and clinically 
derived insights. 
 
The challenge for us, however, was that while Freud’s overall argument remains useful, much of his work 
is regularly misunderstood, misrepresented and dismissed or, alternatively, requires a significant degree 
of scholarly advance or, in many instances, deletion or removal.  And so we had our focus for chapters 5 
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and 6.  Before proceeding, however, we once again made clear the purpose of our work.  Following 
Foucault, we never sought to assemble a comprehensive social psychology of globalization, as it seemed, 
given the complexities of life, ridiculous.  Instead, our aim was always more modest: we sought to create 
a theoretical toolkit to make sense of the struggles in which we find ourselves, which others can use as 
they wish, including modifying it or discarding it altogether, given the different struggles in which they 
find themselves. 
 
In terms of Chapter 6, our goal was to explore, clarify and advance Freud’s twin concepts of drives and 
idstincts; particularly in relation to evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, which seem overall headed 
in the wrong direction.  And to do so, as readers will recall, we had to get rid of or rethink a number of 
things.  First, we got rid of Freud’s empirically indefensible libidinal drive theory, his psychosexual 
stages of development, and all such pejorative terms as castration anxiety and penis envy.  We also had to 
make clear the difference between idstincts and drives.  The former are the domain of evolutionary 
psychology and sociobiology (i.e., hardwired predispositions which require no learning), while the latter 
are the domain of psychoanalysis (i.e., psychosomatic urges, like thirst, which require constant 
management).  Both approaches, if taken too literally, are scientifically wrongheaded.  However, it they 
are used as therapeutic devices, they are powerful.  Here, as a reminder, are three examples of how such 
ideas, when taken too seriously, can go wrong.   
 
To begin, what often makes these approaches mistaken is the paleofantasies they create. These fantasies 
are what paleoanthropologists and evolutionary biologists call ‘just so’ retrospective arguments that look 
to our prehistoric past to explain, in incorrect reductionist fashion, social psychological behaviors in 
which we engage today. 
 
The other problem is the tendency of these paleofantasies to ignore the important evolutionary role of 
social life and to therefore treat society as a consequence of our psychic existence rather than part of its 
cause.  From Chomsky to Fodor, critics have cleaned the rot of these arguments, and still they keep 
coming back.  For example, are Americans economically aggressive because of their prehistoric past or 
because they were recently socialized to succeed in a highly competitive capitalistic society?  Seems the 
answer is mostly the latter, as well as a complex combination of other psychic and socializing forces, such 
as globalization, nostalgic retreat, the psychic defiance of global civil society, the economic pressures of 
the world capitalist system, fear of the global, and in-group/out-group conflict. 
 
The third problem with these paleofantasies – for which Freud can be somewhat excused, but 
contemporary researchers cannot – is the extent to which they limit their literature review to human 
evolution alone, thereby ignoring the phylogenetic lineages most likely to have actually formed our 
primitive psychic functioning, namely our paleomammalian past.  For example, are humans hardwired to 
be aggressive because of our prehistoric campfire life, or because our ancestors were omnivorous 
mammals?  And so, to correct these problems, we turned to several fields of study, including 
paleoanthropology, feminist psychology, cognitive behavioral science, sociological psychology and the 
complexity sciences. 
 
Of these, however, the two most important were affective neuroscience and the embodied mind literature.  
Drawing on the former (e.g., Panksepp & Biven 2012), we were able to widen Freud’s concept of 
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idstincts beyond just sex and aggression to include SEEKING, RAGE, FEAR, LUST, CARE, 
PANIC/GRIEF and PLAY.  Making such a move also allowed us, readers will recall, to embrace the pro-
social aspects of our phylogenetic past, going all the way back to our ancient mammalian emotional past.  
However, as readers recall, we embraced all of this in a highly critical way, avoiding such errors as the 
triune brain a (See Herculano-Houzel 2016). 
 
Drawing on the latter (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1993), we were able to ground Freud’s tripartite 
theory of id-ego-superego in an embodied mind perspective, which helped us demonstrate that the human 
psyche is a complex emergent phenomenon intensely shaped by the socio-ecological environments in 
which it is situated.  This move also allowed us to embrace the evolutionary role of society and to ground 
the concepts of idstincts and drives in the sociology of emotions and the cognitive behavioral sciences.  
Most important, however, when put together, this move allowed us to think of the problems of sex, 
aggression and death as complex social psychologies – situated in a variety of multifaceted socio-
ecological systems, including societal drives – and not just simple idstincts or drives. 
 
All of which took us to Chapter 6 and the heart of our study’s problem: resistance and defiance.  As all 
therapists are taught: people do not like to change until the pain of changing is worse than the pain of 
remaining the same; and even then, they do not want to change; and as soon as they try to change, there 
are others, for the purposes of their own power or dysfunction, who seek to implicitly or explicitly 
sabotage or destroy this change.  In other words, we change in and through our relationships with others, 
including the groups, communities and societies in which we live, as our change almost always affects 
someone else.  And supposing we do manage to change, it is usually not for long, or only in part – as 
long-term sustained change is difficult.  Plus, all such change requires a reasonable degree of awareness 
and understanding of the problems we face, which means we (and those in our lives) have to address our 
cognitive and emotional and societal distortions, as well as the social roles and identities we embrace, and 
the nuanced ways we each have been socialized to understand ourselves and the world(s) in which we 
live.  And, ultimately, it requires us to address our own well-built psychic and societal resistances to 
change.  And that does not even begin to address changing ourselves for the sake of others, particularly 
others we do not like or are in conflict with, or even despise and hate; which amounts to restricting, 
inhibiting and controlling our own pursuit of pleasure or power or happiness for the benefit of these 
‘others,’ who most likely will not reciprocate, and at our own perceived sacrifice and expense.  And that 
is the process for just one of us, let alone an entire group or community or society or the world, where 
billions of people are involved.   
 
Still, change does take place.  In fact, it is a constant of life.  Hence another great riddle of our existence: 
despite all of our resistance and defiance, life never stops changing.  The challenge, then, to come back to 
Freud’s mantra, is how to effectively manage all of this complex and conflicted and contradictory change 
so that the greatest good can be obtained for the greatest number of people; knowing full well that the 
majority of all such efforts will be in vain or even, potentially, counterproductive; or worse, they might 
ironically push people – as we see today, the world-over – to actually defy or rebel against their 
commitments, resulting in the world (or large segments of it) moving in the wrong direction. 
 
And so, to make sense of all of this, at the end of Chapter 6 we needed to engage in an in-depth review of 
Freud’s provocative concepts of repression and resistance.  All of which involved us retro-fitting 
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repression to connect with the current literature on emotional and cognitive distortions, both at the 
individual and societal level, so that we could, as previously stated, treat the current global social 
problems we face as complex social psychologies.  Still, for all of the hubbub involved in deconstructing 
and reconstructing these concepts, Freud’s basic point remains true, regardless of the social scientific 
vocabulary in which it is dressed: if you want people to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number 
of people, one has to use the tools of therapeutic power to help people engage in healthy repression and 
resistance.  And that is no easy job. 
 
All of which, readers will recall, brought us to our global model of resistance; which helped to move us 
along in our research in several important ways.  First, pace Foucault’s theory of power relations and 
Strauss’ concept of negotiated ordering, it allowed us to conceptualize resistance in complex relational 
terms, with the forces of nontherapeutic power and unhealthy resistance on one side; and on the other, the 
forces of therapeutic power and healthy resistance.  As a quick reminder, therapeutic power involves 
either enforcing or promoting some global civic commitment or, alternatively, unveiling or revealing to 
individuals and their in-groups some social psychological insight vis-à-vis some global social problem of 
concern.  In both instances, the purpose is beneficial, constructive, curative, or corrective.  In turn, healthy 
resistance involves protecting one’s self or one’s in-group against the non-therapeutic aspects of power, 
either by refusing to go against one’s global social commitments (e.g., “You cannot make me/us do 
that!”) or by resisting unhealthy societal drives that seek to repress, restrict, manage or ruin one’s positive 
pursuit of happiness (e.g., “Don’t force me/us to repress our selves!”).  In their more volatile form, both 
types of healthy resistance can turn into defiance, civil disobedience or even violence.  In contrast, non-
therapeutic power seeks to oppose, undermine, ruin or rescind the commitments of global civil society; 
or, alternatively, it seeks to persuade or force people to engage in unhealthy forms of resistance.  In either 
case, the goal is harmful, damaging, or detrimental.  In turn, unhealthy resistance desires to avoid, ignore, 
defy or run away from the therapeutic efforts of global civil society (e.g., “Don’t reveal that to me/us!”); 
or, alternatively, it reacts negatively to the demands of global civil society (e.g., “Don’t tell me/us what to 
do!”) – all of which leads to and involves all sorts of unhealthy coping and defense mechanisms or even 
violence and aggression. 
 
Second, pace Walby’s theory of global inequality, it allowed us to situate our model of resistance within 
and across the ten intersecting domains of which our global web of life is comprised.  These range from 
the cultural and ecological to the economic and political (See figures 6.3, and 6.4 in Chapter 6).   
 
Finally, it allowed us to formally conceptualize the major global social problems we currently face – from 
racism and global inequality to political aggression and disruptive climate change – as complex social 
psychological problems, which emerge both from the ground up and the top down.  And so we came to 
the end of Section 3 with a working model of our complex social psychology of globalization intact. 
 
Section	  IV:	  	  
Still, as readers will recall, we had a bit more work to do, as we ultimately assembled our model to delve 
in-depth into two of the most important sets of social psychological tensions that Freud (and we) see as 
crucial to the success of society, global or otherwise.  Both have been mentioned.  The first set, which 
Chapter 7 addressed, is sex, sexuality and gender, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and 
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intersex issues – which we will refer from here on out as LGBTQI.  The second set, which Chapter 8 
addressed, is aggression, otherness and the death instinct.  As concerns these two sets of tensions, 
however, our initial five questions required a slight rewrite.  In their slightly revised form, they were as 
follows: 
• How have the social psychological tensions of sex, aggression and death stood in the way of our 
global commitments? 
• How has globalization in all of its complexity fostered or emboldened these tensions? 
• How have these tensions led to the nontherapeutic and unhealthy defiance of global commitment, 
and by whom and to what extent? 
• How have these tensions and their defiance, across the ten domains of the global web of life, 
helped to create the global social psychological problems we currently face? 
• And, finally, how have these tensions, defiances and global social psychological problems 
challenged the therapeutic power and healthy resistance of global civil society?  
 
Of the various criticisms leveled against Freud, the most damaging are the centrality of his libidinal 
theory, his patriarchy and his heterosexism.  As a reminder, here are the critiques quickly summarized.  
First, while sex is psychologically important, it is not humanity’s psychological raison d'être (Foucault 
1990a).  Second, Freud’s theory is patriarchal insomuch as it is unapologetically phallocentric, treating 
society as the domain of men, and with gender being a basic dualism. Third, despite all of his rebellion 
against Bourgeoisie values – including his progressive belief that lesbian and gay and bisexual individuals 
should not be asked to change who they are – Freud nonetheless privileged heterosexuality and male 
sexual desire above all else, and in so doing saw female hetero-sexuality and LGBTQI individuals as 
marginal, deviant or simply not important. 
 
And so, we were faced a challenge: we could continue to discard Freud’s libidinal theory as patriarchal 
folly and move along (as we did earlier); or we could analyze it head-on and for what it is, in the hopes of 
using our analysis to illustrate what global civil society is up against vis-à-vis sexuality and gender.  We 
chose the latter – which provided, I believe, reasonable results. 
 
As a form of update, Chapter 7 began with a review of a rather long list of terms related to sex, sexuality 
and gender, including such concepts as sexual identity, homo-oppression, and feminism.  From there we 
proceeded to review Freud’s patriarchal heterosexism and his ‘just so’ paleofantasy; which tries to explain 
how, moving from our prehistorical past to the present, civilization slowly emerged out of the effective 
repression of male sexuality and out of the confinement of sex to the marital bed of the conjugal family.  
And it is here, through Freud’s paleofantasy, that one catches a glimpse of how the nuclear family mythos 
and its gendered-division-of-labor was born; and how this Foucaultian truth régime chafes at the 
anthropological realities of the pre-modern, modern, and postmodern family life of global society, in all 
of its incredible and contradictory diversity.  Here also, in this paleofantasy and its corresponding mythos, 
emerges the unhealthy ‘straight’ jacket of heterosexism, as it constrains, forces, demands or, at minimum, 
seeks to non-therapeutically regulate or reduce the rainbow of human sexual diversity into a singular set 
of sexual practices and ways of caring for self and others.  And, it is through the non-therapeutic 
implementation of these practices that the sexual wants, dreams or desires of heterosexual women and the 
LGBTQI communities (despite their healthy resistance) are made irrelevant, deviant or pathological.  Or, 
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worse, they are rigidly and forcefully oppressed, erased, punished or destroyed, as in the case of severe 
forms of homo-oppression and patriarchy. 
 
So, we asked in the second third of Chapter 7, what are the global consequences of the hegemony of 
heterosexist patriarchy and the reactive views of nostalgic and puritanical patriarchy?  The statistics are 
grim: from rape and sexual assault to prostitution and human trafficking to the inequalities of domestic 
and public patriarchy to homo-oppression and physical violence, women and the LGBTQI communities 
continue, the world-over, to be exploited, dominated and oppressed by patriarchal heterosexist 
civilization.  As such, patriarchal heterosexism (including patriarchal and puritanical nostalgia) remains 
one of the most dominant forms of unhealthy resistance and non-therapeutic power standing in the way of 
the global civil rights of women and the LGBTQ communities – and with heterosexual men continuing to 
resist or defy their global accountability or any such therapeutic pressure to share the power, be it at 
home, public life or the workplace. 
 
So, what can be done?  As we discussed throughout our study, ours has never been an investigation into 
solving things; instead, we have focused on helping others better understand some of our collective global 
struggles, primarily by uncovering what most globalization scholars have ignored, namely the complex 
social psychological roots of these problems.  Still, there is significant value is examining how global 
civil society is trying to address such truculent social psychological issues like patriarchal heterosexism, 
particularly as they have emerged across the ten domains of our global web of life.  As such, for the final 
third of Chapter 7 we generated a sociological report card of the world today; with the scorecard being 
hopelessly general and, in large measure, limited; but, sufficient enough, we hoped, that others could 
make better use of it. 
  
While we cannot summarize our report card here, I think readers will agree that most of the conflicted 
advances we reviewed were manifestations, in one form or another, of Foucault’s take on biopower – that 
is, the proliferation of therapeutic body-based techniques and strategies bent on securing for people the 
‘right’ to use their bodies to defy suffering, oppression, domination or exploitation and to achieve 
happiness, health, freedom, and power.  And all of it grounded in Foucault’s inversion of Freud’s idea 
that sexuality and reproductive success drive the cultural domain.  For Foucault, the better research 
question, at least for today, is: what creative practices of culture are emerging out of the new forms of 
gender and sexuality people are choosing to express, including how these new forms are redefining 
heterosexism, patriarchy and traditional notions of family, domestic life, economy, work, politics and, 
ultimately, the distributions of gender-based power relations? 
 
With our exploration of Foucault’s research question complete, we moved along to Chapter 8 and our 
second set of tensions: aggression, otherness, and death.  Perhaps one of the greatest motifs of human 
existence is the battle between good and evil.  On the one side are the protagonists and those who fight for 
life and what it right; and on the ‘other’ side are the antagonists and those who seek, through their cruelty 
and their aggressions, to dominate the world or ruin it. 
 
The power and also danger of this motif – vis-à-vis the issue of in-group/out-group conflict – is its 
simplicity, as it tends to divide the world into the cardboard categories of ‘us’ and ‘them.’  And with the 
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obvious social psychological implication being that we (you and me) are always the ‘us,’ the protagonists; 
and they, the ‘other,’ will never be us, as we will never be them. 
   
Add some global fear and nostalgic retreat to this motif, along with the cognitive and emotional 
distortions of the human psyche and group life, and you have a potentially dangerous situation on your 
hands.  Which we presently do: war, genocide, terrorism, racism, ethnic conflict, cultural and religious 
intolerance, ecological destruction, famine, the refugee crisis, resistance to global civil rights, patriarchy, 
predatory capitalism, inequality, poverty, discrimination, the list just keeps going; and all of it, in one 
form or another, is an act of aggression. 
 
As readers will recall, for Freud there is no single greater threat to the goals of global civil society than 
aggression and its associated distortions.  In fact, he considered the threat so incessantly damaging to any 
collective chance at happiness that, in the later years of his life, he reworked his theory of personality, 
expanding it to become a battle between the forces of Eros (libido and life) and Thanatos (aggression and 
death). 
 
For Freud, the problem with aggression is that, similar to sexual craving, we deal with it by externalizing 
it; that is, by releasing it on ‘others’ and by treating these ‘others’ as the objects of our angers, hostilities, 
resentments, cruelties and aggressive desires, fears and abuse.  In other words, as a core component of our 
psychic and social existence, aggression is fundamentally relational, be it reactive or proactive.  In short, 
find someone engaging in an aggression, and you will also find the victim of its release, the ‘other.’ 
 
As readers will recall, we reviewed several forms of otherness, most notably, the otherness of the 
powerful and that of the oppressed.  In both instances, there is this sense, in the face of global pressures, 
that one is the victim of or, alternatively, the protagonist against some enemy.  In the case of the 
oppressed, however, the perception is generally real; while in the case of the powerful, it seems more a 
frame of mind – which we will discuss again momentarily.  Either way, the result is conflict. 
 
Hence our global model of resistance: daily we live our lives in a conflicted battle of aggressive attack 
and resistance against each other and ourselves, with fear a major motivator.  As readers will recall, some 
of these aggressions, which we reviewed across the ten domains of our global web of life, are base and 
crude, as in the case of mental abuse and sexual assault.  Others are more systemic, as in the case of 
institutional racism and political oppression.  Others, still, are even more subtle and sophisticated: 
complex healthcare legislation aimed at hurting the chronically ill and the elderly; marketplace policies 
that perpetuate white-collar crime; and politicians and social media outlines that foster a cultural climate 
of aggressiveness, bullying, ignorance, intolerance and hate.   
 
And then there is violence and death.  Broken criminal justice systems, police brutality, illegal arms 
trafficking, sectarian violence, petro-dictatorships, terrorism, mass shootings, genocide, domestic and 
racial violence, unbridled consumption of the planet’s resources, disruptive global climate change, 
ecological destruction, the ruin of the planet’s biodiversity.  Humans, Freud makes clear, can be very 
wicked creatures.  And we almost always engage in our aggressions while assuming that we are the 
justified protagonists in the story, and with those ‘others’ being the evil ones. 
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Which took us to another point: aggression is not always for the ‘perceived’ bad, as it can also be for the 
‘perceived’ good.  Also, aggression can be entirely instrumental and without much emotion, as in the case 
of the criminal justice system or the ‘justified’ punishment of wrongdoers.  In short, aggression is a 
complex social psychology. 
 
It is also, more recently, a social psychological reaction to globalization and global civil society, as we 
saw, for example in the case of revolting elitism and global aggressors – which takes us back to the 
‘otherness’ of the powerful.  Revolting elitism is found within the ranks of any country’s meritocracy and 
the professionals that make up global network society; overlapping with this mindset is affluent 
resentment.  These are the individuals against whom the working and lower classes have been recently in 
open revolve – the liberal elite (be they in academia, government, the EU, the United Nations, global 
corporations, the stock market, etc) whom working folks and the poor see as making sure they get 
everything while leaving nothing behind, and also passing policies that benefit only the affluent at the 
expense of the rest.  Revolting elite also tend to be a herd of cats, as they lack a sense of social solidarity, 
given how competitively driven they are to guarantee for only themselves and their kin (and little else) the 
best schooling, neighborhoods, homes, jobs, healthcare, and so on and so forth. 
 
And then there are the global aggressors, which take revolting elitism to the next level in terms of 
privilege, wealth and power, constituting the top most privileged one percent of global society.  The key 
here, however, is the full arsenal of aggression available to these individuals to make the world as they 
desire it to be.  The result of which amounts to a type of game of thrones, with the powerful pitted against 
one another and with the rest of the world paying the price for their anti-social hostilities, be it through 
war or ecological ruin or the instabilities of the world capitalist system.   
 
All of which took us to Freud’s concept of Thanatos.  As we mentioned earlier, Freud saw the 
development of society as part of our species’ evolutionary process; what he called Eros, the life instinct.  
In other words, social life is internal to and necessary for the healthy and mature psychic evolution of the 
human mind.  Still, there is always that part of our creature consciousness that rebels against and seeks to 
defy our sociality, wanting instead to pursue its uninhibited id-based desires.  In other words, there is a 
side of the human psyche that constantly seeks to tear things apart in order to be free of the constraints of 
global civil society and its moral compass; particularly if those constraints are ‘perceived’ as onerous or 
oppressive.  And it is the individual’s desire to raze society (or one’s self) to the ground that Freud called 
our death instinct. 
 
Interestingly enough, social groups and societies can likewise enact their own death instinct, tearing 
themselves apart for a whole host of reasons.  For example, moving through Chapter 8, we saw such self-
attacking behavior in Brexit, the Arab Spring, the election of Trump, the sectarian violence in Africa, and 
the wanton ecological devastation China is causing itself through its uninhibited pursuit of global 
expansion and material wealth.  And, as these different cases demonstrated, some of these aggressions can 
be for the greater good, while others are not; and with most of them being somewhere in the moral 
middle. 
 
So what are we to do?  Readers will remember Freud’s answer.  We are to love our neighbors as 
ourselves, including our enemies!  This is the commandment, in all of its absurd ironic simplicity, which 
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Freud presents to us.  Even though our neighbors and our enemies most likely deserve our wrath, and we 
theirs, some type of negotiated sacrifice and compromise ultimately needs to be made; otherwise, we will 
all go down fighting, and with very few winners in the end, if any. 
 
It is for this reason, Freud argues, that society promotes the developmental manifestation, as we move 
into adulthood, of the superego – a counteracting psychic force equal to our aggressions, which causes us 
to internalize the damage we seek to do to others, and to turn this aggression back at ourselves in the 
reversed form of guilt and shame.  As readers will recall, for some, as in the case of psychopaths, the 
superego’s psychic development never takes place; and for others of us, it is, at best, dulled; and still, for 
others, it can take on a neurotic form, as in the case of far-too-much-anxiety-ridden religious guilt.   
 
Whatever the level, the superego is one of society’s greatest gifts.  So is its corresponding cultural 
superego; which, for the Dali Lama, emerges in the philosophy of kindness; and for sociologists, in the 
form of pro-moral socialization and in the development and embrace of societal rules, laws, mores, 
norms, sanctions, beliefs, legal procedures, codes, religious writings, courts of law, criminal procedures, 
lawyers, judges, police, soldiers, systems of surveillance, and so forth; and for us, in the form of global 
civil society and our corresponding global commitments.  All of which took us to our central theme. 
 
THE	  TRIPARTITE	  PROBLEM	  
I think it safe to say that, over the past handful of decades, globalization and, in turn, fear of the global 
have driven hard on people, the world-over.  In response, the human psyche has seemed conflicted and 
torn. 
 
On one hand there is the desire for primitive retreat, to pull away from globalization to some former and 
more desirable past.  We currently see this in the case of such complex social psychologies as resentful 
nostalgia, racial-ethnic nationalism, puritanical nostalgia, eco-primitivism, and patriarchal nostalgia.  And 
we saw it, to an even wider extent, in the non-therapeutic perpetuation of heterosexist patriarchy, in both 
its domestic and public forms, as well as the perpetuation of homo-oppression and unhealthy resistance to 
the advance of LGBTQI and women’s rights.   
 
On the other hand there is the desire for aggression, both on the part of individuals and the larger groups 
to which they belong.  This aggression also exists, currently, in a variety of social psychological forms, 
manifesting itself across all ten domains of global web of life: from economic and political aggression to 
institutional racism and violence to nationalism and terrorism to war and ecological destruction.  It also 
includes the global aggressors and such related mindsets as neoliberalism, affluent resentment, revolting 
elitism, and the otherness of power.  It also includes everyday people, the world-over, anxiously 
competing with one another to secure their niche in the sociocybernetic infrastructure of global network 
society and the world capitalist system.  And, finally, in terms of the death instinct, it includes the desire, 
through any number of means, to tear globalization apart, to raze global civil society to the ground, and to 
defy our global commitments. 
 
Standing in the psychic way, however, is global civil society, the evolving manifestation of the 
intersection of our individual and cultural superegos.  Equal in its aggression, it too makes its demands 
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known, requiring each of us to “Love our neighbors, including our enemies, as ourselves” and to deal 
with our retreating fears, our resentments and our aggressions, and to embrace such related healthy and 
pro-societal psychologies as kindness, forgiveness, sacrifice, tolerance, negotiation, compromise, maturity 
and growth.  And all of it done to procure for the greatest number of people the best and perhaps only 
chance at the slightest bit of happiness, knowing full well that such a promise, given the frailties of the 
humanity, can never ultimately be kept, as globalization and global civil society are, ultimately, an ill-
fated project to which we presently seem nonetheless condemned to pursue.  
 
And so we come to our theme: the besieged triangular conflict, the world-over, between nostalgic retreat, 
global aggression, and global civil society, all deeply embroiled in global fear, is actually a societal 
expression of an evolving psychological drama played out between our idstinctual drives and our complex 
social psychologies on the one hand, and our superegos on the other; and with our egos in the middle, 
driven by the reality principle, seeking to manage it all.  And it is a drama occurring amongst all 7.5 
billion of us as we collide into other another to produce the global world in which we live.  And with all 
of it socio-historically situated within and influenced by the wider social mediums in which we are 
situated, from our social groups and communities to our cities and countries to our regions and global 
networks.  In other words, globalization, in all of its complexity, including the global social problems it 
has created – from economic instabilities to ecological ruin – is both the cause and consequence of the 
interior machinations of the human psyche and its globally-conflicted relationship with others and itself. 
 
And so it seems that, in many ways, if we are looking outward to solve the problems of the world and, 
more specifically, the tripartite problem of retreat-aggression-civility, we are missing half the picture.  
The enemy also resides within … each of us. 
 
The challenge, however, is that unhealthy resistance to this insight seems all around us, championed by 
the non-therapeutic social power of those who would have us do otherwise.  All of which takes us to the 
rise of the Global Strongarms. 
 
THE	  GLOBAL	  STRONGARMS	  
Since the dawn of civilization, humanity, it seems, has always been under threat of what scholars and 
historians have variously called the Strongarms of the world.  When hearing the name, one thinks almost 
immediately, for example, of the great empires of history: Egyptian, Greek, Mayan, Aztec, Inca, Roman, 
Persian, Chinese, Spanish, British, Russian, and, most recently, American – along with the massive 
national and regional-global dominance they variously obtained.  One also thinks, on second reflection, of 
some of history’s most notorious and ruthless Kings and Queens, Emperors and Dictators, Fascists and 
Despots, Popes and Crusades, Tyrants and Bullies.  And, becoming even more specific, one thinks of the 
20th century and the rise of fascism and the imperialist pursuit of regional-world dominance in places like 
Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan and the worldwide horror, cruelty, destruction and death they caused.  
On a more academic level, one thinks of the field of political psychology, as in the case of such classics as 
Fromm’s Escape from Freedom and Adorno and colleagues’ The Authoritarian Personality, which sought 
to make sense of the authoritarian and fascist mindset that arose during World War II and the holocaust – 
both in terms of the Strongarms of the period (Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, etc) and in terms of those that 
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supported them (e.g., Martin 2001).  More specifically, they wanted to know if such a mindset constituted 
a particular personality type, or, alternatively, a particular social psychological makeup? 
 
The answer, after some fifty years of subsequent research, seems to be most likely no (e.g., Martin 2001).  
Instead, as most historians rigorously emphasize, the better explanation is that the rise of a Strongarm is 
contextually and historically sensitive and therefore shifts over time and place, based on the particular set 
of social psychological and political and socioeconomic conditions in which the Strongarm is situated.  
Such ‘sensitivity to initial conditions’ also helps to define who or what the Strongarm is, as well as those 
who do and do not support them. 
 
All of which brings us to the present.  Today, circa 2018, the Strongarms of the world seem, once again 
on the rise: from president Vladimir Putin of Russia and president Xi Jinping of China, to Marine le Pen 
of France and president Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, to president Donald Trump of the United 
States and president Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey, to the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orban.i  
 
These individuals, whom we will call Global Strongarms, differ from the previous, however, in two key 
ways.  First, the majority of them are heads of states or leaders of political or social movements in 
countries where some form of democratic governance exists, be it parliamentary, presidential, etc.  For 
example, the rise and reign of a Strongarm like Kim Jong Un, the leader of North Korea, differs 
considerably from the rise of a Global Strongarm, like Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary.  
Related, given these differences in political structure, one cannot as easily make the link between the 
social psychology of a non-democratic country and the corresponding rise of its Global Strongarm.  In 
other words, given the significant difference in the political arrangements of other countries, the rise of 
Global Strongarms in democratic countries differs considerably from the Strongarms of the rest of the 
world.  Dictatorships, totalitarian regimes, etc – these are not the chosen forms of government within 
which most people seek to live or pursue happiness, be it a globalized world or not.  Second, their 
positions of power are, in large measure, a function of their views on globalization and global civil 
society, which resonate with those who support them.  And so we have our current focus, which seeks to 
address two questions: 
• What set of unhealthy or nontherapeutic social psychological conditions gave rise to these Global 
Strongarms? 
• How does these Global Strongarms, in turn, use non-therapeutic power to impact the social 
psychology of the countries in which they hold power, particularly to get those who support them 
to defy their respective global commitments? 
 
What	  Gives	  Rise	  to	  the	  Global	  Strongarms?	  
Of our two questions, our first is the one we have devoted almost the full of our study to examining.  
Looking back at the insights we have achieved, I think it safe to say that, while variations across countries 
exists, the initial conditions that give rise to the Global Strongarms seems to be three things: 
 
The first are institutional, socioeconomic and political, with a strong emphasis on inequality and a 
restriction or even collapse in opportunities for the lower and middle-segments of society.  It also includes 
entrenched governmental ineffectiveness; the rise of meritocracy and revolting elitism; the upsurge of 
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within-country global aggressors (stock markets, financial investors, corporations, etc); the increasing 
competitiveness of racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants; the ‘supposed’ spread of secular liberalism; 
growing multiculturalism; and the rising tide of various global threats (i.e., terrorism, world markets, 
foreign competitors, etc), which are seen as due, in large measure, to the ineffective ways the respective 
country is dealing with the forces of globalization and the restrictions and demands of global civil society. 
 
Related to these conditions is the upswing in the legitimacy and reach of the agents of defiance and their 
arguments.  Again, while variations exist, including their motives for doing so, the agents of defiance 
share a common theme insomuch as they blame global civil society (and, more specifically, liberal and 
secular elites and the governments, academic institutions, scientific organizations, media outlets, and 
other public institutions they run) for the problems of globalization.  Some of which these agents of 
defiance argue may be ‘trumped up,’ as in the case of racism or ethnic conflict or ecological issues and 
disruptive climate change.  And, while our name for these agents is new, our review of their various 
social movements is not.  Readers will recall, for example, we discussed these movements in Chapter 3 
during our review of social media and global network society and while assembling our global report 
cards in chapters 7 and 8.  Having made this point, we also need to make clear that the agents of defiance 
vary greatly in their degree of dissent; as well as the level of civil unrest they seek to pursue; the degree to 
which they embrace various forms of global aggression or nostalgic retreat; and, also, the legitimacy of 
their concerns about the failed promises of global civil society, some of which are actually accurate and 
empirically valid.  For example, revolting elitism is a major social problem.   
 
Still, accurate or not, the combination of these conditions ‘stokes the flames’ of global fear and 
resentment; which, in turn, leads to a significant rise in the complex social psychologies (and their 
nuanced intersection) we have sought to address in this study, most notably the tripartite problem that 
exists between nostalgic retreat, global aggression and global civil society.  And so it seems, in summary, 
that in those countries where a critical mass regarding all of the above conditions has been reached, a 
tipping point takes place, out of which emerges the Global Strongarms.   
 
The	  Defiance	  of	  the	  Global	  Strongarms	  
The real question for us, however, is the second issue: how Global Strongarms use their non-therapeutic 
power to influence the unhealthy social psychology of those who support them, mostly in an effort to 
persuade them to resist or defy their respective global commitments.  As with our first question, we have 
been exploring this issue throughout our study, albeit indirectly.  But first we require a caveat.  Given our 
sensitivity to differences based on initial conditions, what follows is only a minimal definition; that is, it is 
a review of the smallest amount of information necessary to characterize someone as a Global Strongarm. 
 
Global	  Strongarms	  Defined:	  
As concerns global civil society and the defiance of global commitments, Global Strongarms are distinct 
in several key ways.  To begin, they acknowledge the very real complaints that large (and mostly 
conservative) segments of the upper to lower socioeconomic ranks have about the institutional, socio-
economic and political conditions that threaten their respective happiness, including a strong emphasis on 
inequality and the collapse of opportunities for these segments of society.  Even more important: they 
embrace these arguments in a way that their opponents on the Left seem unable to accomplish.  We saw 
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this, for example, in the pro-Brexit movement; the nationalist movement in the Netherlands; Marine Le 
Pen’s ability to co-opt the pro-labor economic arguments of the French Left; and in the anti-immigration 
movements in Germany; as well as with Putin in Russia. 
 
And here is the other key difference: unlike the political and cultural Left (however defined in a particular 
country), the Global Strongarms actively support the complex social psychologies of nostalgic retreat and 
global aggression, from revolting elitism and nostalgic heterosexist patriarchy to affluent resentment and 
ecological aggression.  And that is why such large (mostly conservative) segments of the upper to lower 
ranks of society tend to support them.  For example, looking at exit poll statistics from the 2016 United 
States presidential race, those who voted for Trump were older, mostly male, less educated, Christian, 
religious, married, Republican, middle to upper level incomes, and predominantly white.ii  Exit polls also 
suggested that these individuals saw the country as ‘off track’ and immigration and terrorism as the top 
issues; they also felt they were ‘worse off’ today than previous; and they overwhelming supported 
deporting illegal immigrants and building a wall between the States and Mexico; were also angry that 
government was not working; and one of the reasons they voted for Trump was their desire to see things 
change.iii  But here, also, is another key statistic: Trump won amongst those voters who waited until the 
last two months or even the last few days of the election.iv 
 
Even more important, the Global Strongarms seem to believe that retreating nostalgics and global 
aggressors (as well as the agents of defiance) see the world correctly – unlike the biased cultural or 
political Left or the prejudiced stewards of global civil society (again, however these groups or mindsets 
are defined in a particular country).  Even more, the Global Strongarms believe that the retreating 
nostalgic and globally aggressive way of viewing the world, along with the fear and resentments and 
cognitive and emotional distortions upon which it is based, will make things better again.  And, it is here, 
through this point and the previous, that it becomes clear why the Global Strongarms resonate so well 
with the complex nostalgic and aggressive social psychological and socioeconomic and political 
conditions out of which they emerge.  
 
Ironically enough, however, the Global Strongarms only seem to indirectly accuse globalization itself for 
the problems of their society, given the important role that global markets, the world capitalist system, 
and their country’s respective global aggressions plays in their society’s wealth and power.  Instead, they 
blame the problems of globalization on global civil society, or certain key aspects of it – again, some of 
which is legitimate critique, which is what gives these arguments their air of believability.  One example 
would be the Brexit critique of EU trade regulations that economically stifle the UK; despite all of the 
relative benefits gained. 
 
Which goes to our next point: to make these arguments, Global Strongarms (and the agents of defiance) 
often ignore the facts on an issue; seeking instead to ground their arguments in the global fears, 
resentments, anger, anxieties, inequalities, conflicts, and ‘otherness’ of people. This approach has led 
some to say Western society has become a post-fact society.  Post-fact society is defined as: (a) the 
postmodern state of being able to say things because they feel right and without worry about their factual 
basis; (b) feigning balance when, in fact, the arguments being set forth are highly biased or lacking factual 
evidence; or (c) delegitimizing real news, facts and science as fake or biased because these sources 
counter one’s views or opinions of beliefs.v  
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We note here, also, how a post-fact approach links with the cognitive and emotional distortions and self-
defeating beliefs we explored in Chapter 6.  Also, a post-fact view is not confined to the political right or 
Global Strongarms.  It also emerges on the cultural and political left; mainly through the extremes of 
postmodern identity politics, where one’s intersectionality can become more important than the facts of 
what is said.  For example, there are those who assert that the dominant heterosexual ethnicity of a 
country can never speak to the inequalities of minorities or the LGBTQI communities because they are 
part of the patriarchal heterosexist, racist majority.  It can also lead some with such views to also endorse 
a Global Strongarm, as in the case of Labor in Germany or France supporting nostalgic nationalism 
because the leftist elite of the EU does not understand their struggles.  In turn, revolting elites often 
embrace a self-affirming, fact-less view of the working and middle classes as somehow ignorant or 
unaware of the global world(s) in which they live.  Again, it keeps going…  And all of its preyed upon by 
the Global Strongarms. 
 
Which takes us to the next point: Global Strongarms defy global civil society in a way that pits people 
against one another (both within their own country and the world-over), primarily by exploiting their 
opposing sense of ‘otherness’ – be it perceived or real.  In other words, they persuade people (including 
those who are opposed to them, as in the case of the cultural and political left) to give up on agreement 
and such healthy defense mechanisms as tolerance, negotiation and compromise; and to instead embrace 
their individual and group-based cognitive and emotional distortions, as well as their unhealthy or 
pathological defense mechanisms and self-defeating beliefs. 
 
Global Strongarms also seek to convince a sufficient number of people that, in the interests of their 
pursuit of happiness, it is best to turn away from, resist or even outright defy their larger global 
commitments.  The reason being that sacrifice and kindness are a ‘zero-sum game,’ which will benefit 
their out-groups and enemies while simultaneously bringing about their own ruin.  And, as support, they 
tend to identify a scapegoat or some combination of enemies (e.g., elites, immigrants, scientists, etc), 
whom they implicitly or explicitly blame for the current ills of society.  And, as we have hopefully made 
clear throughout our study, they do so whether such individuals or groups are correctly to blame or not. 
 
And, finally, they promise their supporters that, if they follow the Global Strongarm and do all of the 
above their society will once again become safe and secure.  And, equally important, it will become, once 
again, great!   
 
THE	  ADJACENT	  POSSIBLE	  
So, given all that we have learned in our study, what are those of us who support global civil society to 
do?  I believe there are several things that can be done, all of which have as their aim the complex social 
psychology of globalized life today.  And with the knowledge, of course, that these solutions go hand-in-
hand with changes at the policy level, which seek to address the institutional, socioeconomic, political, 
and ecological challenges people, the world-over, presently face. 
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First, we need to start with the facts.  The conditions and forces of globalization constitute the current 
form of societal organization through which we, as a global society, are evolving.  And this is true for 
those societies with our without Global Strongarms and with or without democratic process. 
 
Second, along with these conditions, one also needs to acknowledge, in very real ways, that there are 
those (e.g., individuals, groups, companies, governments) that will always, in various ways, actively resist 
or defy their global commitments, be it implicitly or explicitly, or consciously or unconsciously. Or 
worse, they will actively seek to hurt, harm and destroy or, alternatively, exploit, dominate and oppress 
others – all for their own joy and happiness.  Examples include the unbridled consumption behaviors of 
many western societies; the active embrace of heterosexist patriarchy throughout most of the world; the 
perpetuation of homophobia and racism and ethnic conflict; humanity’s continued usage of violence, war 
and terrorism to solve problems; and our nearly uninhibited decimation of the environment.   
Third, one must be willing to acknowledge that, given the current battle over global civil society taking 
place the world-over (from the aggressions of China and India to the internecine conflicts of Africa and 
the Middle East to the retreatism of Europe and the United States), things may be going backwards or, at 
best, improving in highly contradictory ways – at least in terms of global civil rights, reduced inequality, 
and increased wellbeing for the lives of the oppressed. 
 
Related, global civil society, at least for the foreseeable future, will most likely, at best, stumble along, 
with a very limited degree of impact or power.  And we will most likely ecologically ruin our world, 
resulting in a diminished way of life for most people the world-over (particularly the most vulnerable), 
and with the economic divide amongst the affluent and the rest of the world becoming worse rather than 
better; and with the global aggressors coming out on top, as they almost always do.  In other words, I 
currently see no happy ending for most of the world, whether globalization continues (as the globalists 
desire) or comes to a screeching halt (as the nostalgics want), as the global social problems we have 
created for ourselves will continue to exist either way.  As such, our adjacent possible will have to 
continue lingering in the shadows, waiting. 
 
Still, no matter how bleak our portrait, it seems to me that, only by acknowledging these complex social 
psychological realities, as Freud suggests we do, that we can truly sustain the long-haul of nonetheless 
trying to make the world a better place. 
 
Fourth, one needs to acknowledge, embrace, and ultimately address the conditions and concerns of those 
who oppose global civil society; otherwise they will continue to fall prey to the nontherapeutic power and 
unhealthy resistance of the Global Strongarms of the world; or any such related social movements.  An 
excellent example of this point in the States is Joan Williams’s 27 May 2017 New York Times article, 
The Dumb Politics of Elite Condescension.  As both a highly regarded feminist legal scholar and 
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California, Williams makes it clear that unless the 
conditions and concerns of those who voted for Trump are embraced, their related fears and resentments 
will continue to “morph in ugly ways.”  Alternatively, however, by embracing and working with these 
fears and resentments, there is a chance to change minds and improve life, as Williams explains, “not just 
for some groups, but for all groups.”  For example, as we saw earlier, many of those who voted for Trump 
only chose him as a candidate in the final hours. 
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One can read our fourth point, as well, in part, as a complex social psychological reaction to the 
aggressiveness of the cultural superego of global civil society.  As readers will recall, in Civilization and 
Its Discontents, Freud was very much concerned not only with how people restricted their desires and 
pursuits for the betterment of society; but also, how global civil society would reimburse, offset or reward 
this deprivation – see the end of Chapter 4 of our study.  The reason being that, otherwise neurosis (both 
individually and socially) will emerge (1930, p. 75).  As such, Freud wanted to know the various ways 
civilization would provide people other and more pro-social pursuits and outlets so as to keep people 
participating in society, rather than defying or rebelling against it.  
 
A similar concern can be made in terms of those who oppose global civil society today – be they living 
under the influence of a Global Strongarm of not. We need to find more therapeutic ways to mange the 
‘perceived’ or ‘real’ aggressions of the cultural superego of global civil society.  An example is the 
‘punishing’ tone that tends to go with discussions about ecological issues and disruptive global climate 
change.  Some have argued, for example, that to help people actually change their behaviors, you have to 
engage in positive messages and what is now called, for example, nudging behavior – the behavioral 
science technique of helping people make small but key incremental changes that have a large, emergent, 
macroscopic effect, as in the case of health and environmental behaviors or more efficient financial and 
workplace decisions or working better in highly diverse groups.  
 
But, that is not the end to it.  While addressing the concerns of those who rebel against global civil 
society, one also needs to continue to support the healthy social psychological resistance of those 
struggling against the non-therapeutic powers of heterosexist patriarchy, homo-oppression, racism, 
xenophobia, ecological destruction, health inequalities, human trafficking, physical violence, and all other 
forms of global aggression.  
 
Finally, and by way of summary, the most important thing one can do is use the tools of therapeutic 
power to help ourselves, as individuals, more effectively struggle with the global tripartite problem of 
retreat-aggression-civility, as manifested within the interiors of our own psyches, so that we can embrace 
our oceanic existence and find a more mature and healthier happiness. 
 
I had the good fortunate several years ago to have a small group of Tibetan Buddhists visit our campus of 
Kent State University, mostly to discuss the challenges of living in a global society.  After some rather 
extensive discussion, one of the students asked, “Given the level of suffering in the world, what is one 
person to do?”  To which one of the monks immediately replied, “Are your parents still living?  Do you 
have family or friends? Do you live in a community of which you are a part?  If so, just focus on taking 
care of them.”  I spent years reflecting on the monk’s comment, as it seemed all too simple.  Certainly so 
much more could be done.  But, the more I thought about it, the more it seemed correct: rearranging the 
interior of our psyches is not only difficult work, it requires, as my Dad pointed out, healthy relationships 
– be it on any given Sunday or any other day of the week – all in our broken effort, as humans, to 
embrace the simplest and most difficult of all the commandments, “To love our neighbors as ourselves, 
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